The feminine singular forms identify the eye itself as the grammatical subject and object throughout the saying. עַיִן (ʿayin, “eye”) is grammatically feminine; consequently תִּלְעַג (tilʿag, Qal imperfect 3fs, “mocks”) and תָּבוּז (tābûz, Qal imperfect 3fs, “despises”) agree with it. Likewise, the feminine singular suffixes on יִקְּרוּהָ (yiqqerûhā, “they will pick it out”) and יֹאכְלוּהָ (yoʾkelûhā, “they will eat it”) refer most immediately to the eye. The syntax thus deliberately retains the eye as the focus of the retribution rather than shifting grammatically to an unnamed rebellious child. This grammatical precision does not reduce the proverb to an isolated penalty upon a bodily organ. In wisdom idiom the eye represents the person’s disdainful outlook and visible expression of contempt. The eye “mocks” the father and “despises” maternal obedience because it embodies the settled posture of a son or daughter who rejects parental authority. The eye is singled out in the judgment because it is the organ through which contempt has been expressed, while its destruction graphically signifies the ruin of the offender. The imperfects are not a legal prescription for corporal punishment; they present the fitting, dreadful outcome of such entrenched rebellion. The ravens of the wadi and the young of the נֶשֶׁר (nešer), a large carrion bird often rendered “eagle,” portray an unburied corpse exposed to scavengers, the public reversal of the proud gaze that had scorned father and mother.

The negative לֹא (loʾ) governs both coordinated clauses: Agur denies both having acquired wisdom and possessing the knowledge expressed in the second colon. Hebrew commonly omits a repeated negative when two verbal clauses are joined by waw. Thus the sense is, “I have not learned wisdom, nor do I know the knowledge of the holy ones.” A rendering that makes the second clause affirmative conflicts with the syntax, the parallelism, and the self-abasing confession begun in v. 2. The first verb, לָמַדְתִּי (lamadti), is a Qal perfect first common singular, referring to the acquisition of wisdom as an accomplished attainment: Agur cannot claim to have been trained into wisdom or to have mastered it. The second, אֵדָע (ʾedaʿ), is a Qal imperfect first common singular. Under the continuing force of loʾ, it expresses his present lack of knowledge: “nor do I know.” The variation is therefore purposeful rather than contradictory. Agur disclaims both the process of attaining wisdom and the settled possession of the transcendent knowledge to which wisdom leads. This double denial prepares for v. 4, where the questions concerning ascent to heaven, control of wind and waters, and the Creator's name expose the distance between human limitation and divine sovereignty. Agur's language is not a denial that true wisdom exists, nor a repudiation of the instruction given in Proverbs. It is a confession that wisdom in its ultimate source and fullness belongs to the Holy One, whereas the human speaker stands before God as dependent and uninstructed apart from divine disclosure.

In Proverbs 6:12, “a man of Belial” designates a worthless, lawless person rather than identifying the man as an adherent of, or embodiment of, a personal being named Belial. The construction ʾādām beliyyaʿal (“man of Belial”) is followed in apposition by ʾîš ʾāwen (“man of iniquity”), so that the second expression interprets the first. Beliyyaʿal characterizes the man by moral corruption and destructive uselessness, while ʾāwen denotes wickedness, trouble, or iniquity. The verse therefore introduces the same malicious figure whose deceptive gestures and ruinous purposes are unfolded in vv. 13-15. The noun beliyyaʿal commonly occurs in the Old Testament in expressions such as “sons of Belial,” referring to people marked by rebellion, baseness, or utter moral worthlessness. Its traditional analysis as belî, “without,” plus yaʿal, “profit” or “worth,” accords well with this usage, though the word functions as an established designation and need not be freshly parsed in every occurrence. In the Hebrew Bible it is not ordinarily a proper name for Satan. Later Jewish literature and the New Testament can use Belial as a personal name for the evil one, most notably in 2 Corinthians 6:15, but that later demonological usage should not control Proverbs 6:12. Here Belial names the character of a human evildoer: he is devoted to ʾāwen and manifests that settled perversity in speech and conduct.

The expression מֵעֲצַת־נָפֶשׁ (meʿăṣat-nepeš), “from counsel of soul,” describes counsel marked by inward sincerity and personal earnestness, and in context it is the counsel communicated by the friend whose sweetness is praised. The second colon therefore means that the delightfulness of a friend arises from advice that proceeds from the depths of the person, rather than from superficial flattery or detached calculation. The construct phrase עֲצַת־נָפֶשׁ (ʿăṣat-nepeš) has no explicit pronominal suffix, but Hebrew commonly uses נפשׁ (nepeš), “soul,” for the inner self, desire, or whole person. English renderings such as “earnest counsel,” “heartfelt counsel,” or “sincere advice” rightly convey the force of the phrase. The masculine suffix in רֵעֵהוּ (rēʿēhû), “his friend,” probably reflects the proverb’s conventional third-person perspective rather than distinguishing the friend from some otherwise identified man. Although the grammar does not formally attach “soul” to “friend,” the parallel movement of the verse supplies the connection: fragrant oil and incense bring delight to the heart; similarly, a friend proves sweet through counsel issuing from the inner person. Taking the phrase as self-counsel, as though the proverb contrasted friendship with private reflection, lacks support in the syntax and disrupts the positive development of the two cola. Proverbs elsewhere distinguishes faithful rebuke from deceptive speech (27:5-6); this verse commends the inwardly genuine counsel through which true friendship becomes a source of gladness.

The imperfect יִמְצָא (yimṣāʾ, Qal imperfect third masculine singular) has a gnomic force here: it states the characteristic outcome of prudent attention to the matter at hand. The participle מַשְׂכִּיל (maśkîl, Hiphil participle), “one acting prudently” or “one who gives intelligent attention,” identifies a habitual kind of person, and the imperfect describes what such prudence ordinarily discovers, namely טוֹב (ṭôb), “good,” understood as well-being, advantage, or a favorable outcome. The form can naturally be translated “finds good,” though “will find good” appropriately preserves the Hebrew imperfect's prospective dimension. It should not be read as an unconditional prediction that every prudent decision will immediately prosper, since Proverbs itself recognizes circumstances in which the righteous suffer and the wicked temporarily flourish. The second colon intensifies and grounds the first by locating genuine well-being in trust in Yahweh. בוֹטֵחַ (bōṭēaḥ, Qal participle), “one trusting,” parallels מַשְׂכִּיל and likewise depicts a settled disposition. Yet the conclusion shifts from the verbal result, “finds good,” to אַשְׁרָיו (ʾašrāyw), an exclamatory plural construct with a third masculine singular suffix, “blessed is he” or “happy is he.” This term pronounces the enviable state of the person whose confidence rests in the covenant LORD. In the immediate context, human planning and discernment remain significant, but their soundness depends upon submission to Yahweh's sovereign ordering of human steps (16:1, 3, 9). Thus the verse presents prudent discernment as a true means of good, while trust in Yahweh names the deeper condition in which that good is rightly possessed and understood.

The “chambers of the belly” depict the hidden interior of a person, the inward place where speech is received, retained, and allowed to shape judgment and affection. The pronoun הֵם (hēm, “they”) refers to the whisperer’s words, and יָרְדוּ (yāredû, Qal perfect, “they go down”) functions proverbially: such words characteristically penetrate beneath the surface rather than passing away as casual conversation. The image extends the comparison with desirable food. Slander is accepted with an appetite and then lodged in the hearer’s inward life. חַדְרֵי־בָטֶן (ḥadrê-bāṭen), literally “rooms” or “chambers of the belly,” employs bodily language for the concealed center of thought and desire. In Proverbs 20:27 the human spirit searches “all the chambers of the belly,” and Proverbs 20:30 speaks of discipline cleansing the same inward chambers. The expression therefore does not chiefly describe the physical process of swallowing; it denotes the recesses of the inner person, where motives and impressions reside. The whisperer’s speech is dangerous because it gains an internal foothold in its hearer, fostering suspicion and relational fracture from within. Its verbatim recurrence in Proverbs 26:22 confirms that this is a settled observation about the peculiar attractiveness and enduring inward effect of gossip.

תַּמְרוּק (tamrûq) is best read as a noun, “a cleansing” or “a scouring,” rather than as a finite verb. The first colon is therefore a verbless nominal clause: “Wound-stripes are a cleansing for evil.” The form is plausibly derived from מרק (māraq), “to scour, polish, cleanse,” and functions as the predicate nominative after the construct expression חַבֻּרוֹת פֶּצַע (ḥabburôt peṣaʿ), “stripes producing a wound” or “wounding welts.” The proverb characteristically compresses its assertion, omitting the copula as Hebrew nominal clauses commonly do. This reading also accounts for the syntax of the second colon, “and blows, [for] the chambers of the belly.” No separate verb need be supplied from a different construction; the predicate תַּמְרוּק governs both coordinated subjects. The sense is that wounds which reach the exterior, and blows which penetrate to the inward parts, serve as a cleansing remedy in relation to evil. “Chambers of the belly” (ḥadrê-bāṭen) is an idiom for the deepest interior, the hidden inward self, rather than a technical reference to particular abdominal organs. Some English versions translate tamrûq verbally, “blows that wound cleanse away evil,” because this yields smooth English and expresses the practical force of the saying. That rendering communicates the likely sense, but the nominal rendering more closely preserves the Hebrew construction and the parallelism. The proverb presents severe corrective punishment as a purgative response to wrongdoing: its focus is the disciplinary removal of evil, not a claim that bodily suffering automatically effects moral or spiritual atonement.

The expression denotes welcome tidings that come from a remote place, with the distance heightening the relief and pleasure of their arrival. The preposition מִן (min, “from”) marks source, while אֶרֶץ מֶרְחָק (’erets merḥaq) is literally “a land of distance,” an idiom for a far-off country. The saying therefore need not identify the content of the report as political or commercial news concerning that country. Its emphasis falls upon good news received from a place so remote that communication, knowledge, and reunion are ordinarily uncertain or delayed. This sense accords with the verse’s concern for refreshment after deprivation. “Cold waters” (mayim qarim) meet the need of a weary person (nepeš ʿayēpâ), where nepeš refers to the living self in its exhausted condition rather than to an immaterial element alone. Similarly, good tidings (šemûʿâ ṭôbâ) alleviate the anxiety associated with great separation. Proverbs 15:30 likewise associates good report with bodily renewal: “good news refreshes the bones.” The parallel in 25:25 does not require a literal traveler or an absent relative, though such circumstances readily illustrate it; it presents the arrival of favorable information from beyond ordinary reach as an experience comparable to life-giving cool water.

The phrase “a bag of silver” depicts the husband as leaving with funds sufficient for an extended absence, probably connected with travel and commercial business, though the text does not define the purpose of his journey. צְרוֹר הַכֶּסֶף (tseror hakkesep) denotes a bound bundle or pouch containing silver. Since silver commonly served as money by weight in the Old Testament world, the expression refers to portable wealth rather than to a fixed number of coins. The perfect לָקַח (laqach, “he has taken”) presents his departure as an accomplished fact, while the phrase “in his hand” underscores that the money has gone with him. Within the woman’s speech, the detail supplies calculated reassurance. Her claim is that her husband is far away, equipped for travel, and therefore unable to return suddenly. The bag itself is not evidence that he has abandoned his household or that the journey is necessarily immoral; it is evidence, as she presents it, that his absence is deliberate and adequately provisioned. Together with the stated return date in the following clause, the reference forms part of her attempt to remove the young man’s fear of discovery. The narrative, however, has already identified her speech as seductive and deceptive in character (7:10, 18, 21), so her apparent knowledge of the husband’s plans serves the plot of entrapment rather than furnishing a reliable moral assurance.

The expression “the wicked do not understand knowledge” identifies a moral and judicial incapacity rather than a deficiency in information. דעת (daʿat), “knowledge,” stands as the object of יָבִין (yābîn), a Qal imperfect of בין (bîn), “to discern, understand.” In Proverbs, daʿat commonly denotes perception shaped by the fear of the Lord and ordered toward wise judgment (cf. Prov 1:7, 2:5-6). The wicked person may possess facts about a poor litigant’s condition, yet lacks the discerning knowledge by which that condition is rightly evaluated before God and within the community’s courts. The terseness of the second colon heightens the contrast. The righteous person is characterized by an active participle, יֹדֵעַ (yōdēaʿ), indicating a settled disposition to know the דין (dîn), the case, claim, or legal right, of the poor. By contrast, the wicked “does not understand knowledge”: he fails to grasp the very moral reality that ought to govern judgment. The proverb therefore does not treat neglect of the poor as a merely accidental failure of attention. It exposes such neglect as consonant with wickedness because it reveals alienation from the knowledge that wisdom imparts. This usage accords with the wider theology of Proverbs, in which true knowledge includes recognition of the Lord’s moral order. The righteous discern the poor person’s case because their judgment is responsive to that order; the wicked, though perhaps socially powerful or legally informed, cannot properly perceive what wisdom calls them to recognize. The clause thus supplies the inner diagnosis for the outward contrast in the first line.

The preposition בְּ (be) in בְּיִרְאַת יְהוָה (beyirʾat YHWH) denotes the accompanying condition or sphere in which the “little” (meʿaṭ) is held: a small estate possessed in the fear of the LORD. It should not be reduced to a simple statement that a devout person happens to own little. The construct phrase “fear of the LORD” identifies covenantal reverence, expressed in submission to the LORD’s moral order, as the defining circumstance of that limited possession. Such reverence gives the small portion its proper character and renders it preferable to its alternative. The proverb’s comparative adjective טוֹב (ṭôb), “better,” sets two forms of life in moral and practical evaluation. The contrasting “great treasure” (ʾôṣār rāb) is not condemned as treasure in itself, nor is material scarcity praised as inherently virtuous. Its inferiority arises because it is joined to “tumult in it,” a condition incompatible with the settled well-being that attends the fear of the LORD. Proverbs regularly treats the fear of the LORD as the beginning of wisdom and as a source of life; accordingly, 15:16 evaluates wealth by the spiritual and relational order in which it is possessed. The verse therefore asserts that modest means under reverent allegiance to the LORD are genuinely superior to abundance attended by disruptive disorder.

The alternation reflects the distinct petitions being made, not uncertainty about the One addressed. In the preceding verse Agur directs his request to God, and v. 8 continues that prayer. הַרְחֵק (harḥēq), a Hiphil imperative of רחק (rāḥaq), asks God actively to remove falsehood from him. Similarly, הַטְרִיפֵנִי (haṭrîpēnî), a Hiphil imperative of טרף (ṭārap), asks God to supply him with food. Between these positive requests stands אַל־תִּתֶּן־לִי (ʾal-tittēn-lî), literally, “do not give to me,” where אַל with the imperfect form functions as a prohibitive entreaty directed to God. The syntax therefore sets out three coordinated requests: remove deceptive speech, withhold both destitution and wealth, and provide the allotted sustenance. The negative petition is appropriately expressed by a prohibition because poverty and riches are conceived as conditions that God may give or withhold in his providential rule. This does not make wealth intrinsically sinful or poverty inherently virtuous. Verses 9 supplies the rationale: abundance may tempt Agur to deny the Lord, while want may tempt him to theft and thus to profane God’s name. The imperative forms consequently portray a dependent prayer for God’s governing provision, while the prohibitive form asks that two spiritually perilous extremes be withheld.

The noun מִדְחֶה (midḥeh) denotes a downfall or ruin, with the underlying sense of being driven or thrust away. Thus “a smooth mouth makes a driving away” is not chiefly a statement that flattering speech causes a person to be socially excluded, though alienation may result. The point is that persuasive, flattering speech produces destruction: it brings its victim into calamity or casts him down. The Qal imperfect יַעֲשֶׂה (yaʿăśeh, “makes, produces”) presents this as the characteristic effect of such speech. “Smooth” (חָלָק, ḥālāq) describes speech that is flattering, ingratiating, and deceptively pleasant rather than simply courteous. In Proverbs, smooth speech is associated with seduction and moral deception (Prov. 2:16; 5:3; 7:5). The parallel with the “lying tongue” identifies the smooth mouth as another form of false and hostile speech. Proverbs 26:23-27 has exposed the person who conceals hatred beneath gracious words and whose malicious designs finally recoil upon himself. Verse 28 concludes that such verbal deceit has destructive consequences for those whom it targets: hatred may speak through overt falsehood or through polished flattery, but both aim at and effect ruin.

The verb תַּדִּיחֶנּוּ (taddîḥennû), Hiphil imperfect third feminine singular with a third masculine singular suffix from נדח (nadaḥ), portrays the woman as driving the youth onward by the persuasive force of her speech. Although נדח commonly denotes driving away, expelling, or leading astray, its sense here is not physical banishment. In the context of the adulteress's calculated solicitation, it signifies forceful inducement: her smooth lips press him from wavering toward compliance. English versions that render the verb “seduces,” “compels,” or “urges him on” properly convey this contextual sense, though “drives him” preserves more clearly the verb's forceful imagery. The shift from the perfect הִטַּתּוּ (hiṭṭattû), “she has turned him aside,” to the imperfect does not mark a chronological reversal. The perfect presents her persuasive speech as having achieved its decisive effect, while the imperfect depicts its continuing or consequent operation: by the flattery of her lips she drives him along. The following verse confirms the result, for the young man goes after her “suddenly,” without recognizing that the path leads to death. Thus the final colon intensifies the first. Her speech has not simply attracted him; it has displaced him from the way of wisdom and impelled him toward the ruin already anticipated throughout the chapter.

“Will not be cleared” is judicial language, yet the proverb’s certainty reaches beyond the contingencies of an earthly courtroom to the judgment of God. The verb yinnāqeh, Niphal imperfect of nāqâ, denotes being held free of guilt or released from liability. In this setting, where the offender is an ʿēd šĕqārîm, “a witness of lies,” the term concerns acquittal from the charge and penalty incurred by false testimony rather than inward purification from sin. The false witness may intend to secure another’s condemnation or to escape personal consequences, but he will not finally be declared innocent. The immediate social background is the legal importance of testimony in Israel. A witness could materially determine the outcome of a dispute, and false witness therefore constituted a direct assault upon justice. The Torah similarly treats false testimony as a serious covenantal offense and requires that the intended penalty fall upon the malicious witness (Deut. 19:16-21). Proverbs does not here set out court procedure; it states the moral certainty underlying such procedure. The repeated negative imperfect, lōʾ yinnāqeh, expresses a settled consequence: false testimony does not place its speaker beyond judgment. The parallel clause, though employing different language, confirms this comprehensive sense. One who habitually utters lies will “not escape” (lōʾ yimmālēṭ, Niphal imperfect of mālaṭ). Human tribunals may fail to detect a lie, but no concealment removes the liar from the righteous judgment presupposed throughout Proverbs. Thus the saying encompasses both the public legal wrong of perjury and the divine judgment by which unjust verdicts and hidden deceit are finally answered.

The proverb identifies a person's honor with forbearance toward an offense committed against him. The suffix in תִפְאַרְתּוֹ (tipʾartô, “his glory, honor”) refers to the אדם (ʾādām) of the first colon: the wise person's dignity is displayed in passing over a פָּשַׁע (pešaʿ), a rebellious or culpable offense. “Glory” can denote public esteem, but here it primarily names the honorable excellence that rightly gives rise to esteem. The second colon therefore states that overlooking an offense is a mark of honor rather than weakness or indifference to righteousness. The construction עֲבֹר עַל־פָּשַׁע (ʿăbōr ʿal-pešaʿ), a Qal infinitive construct of עָבַר (ʿābar, “pass over”) with עַל, depicts refusing to seize upon an offense for immediate retaliation. In this context, following the statement that understanding “lengthens his anger,” the transgression is naturally another's provocation, not the man's own wrongdoing. The verse does not commend hiding personal guilt, which elsewhere requires confession and repentance, nor does it abolish proper justice where offenses demand adjudication. It commends the restraint that does not magnify every personal insult into a quarrel. Proverbs 17:9 expresses the same wisdom by praising the one who covers an offense in pursuit of love, while Micah 7:18 uses comparable language of the Lord's merciful passing over of transgression. Human forbearance in Proverbs 19:11 reflects that moral pattern on the creaturely level.

Proverbs 28:3 depicts a poor man who nevertheless oppresses the poor, not a wealthy oppressor in general. The phrase geber rash joins geber, "man," with rash, the Qal active participle of rush, "to be poor," functioning adjectivally: "a poor man." The following participle, we'osheq, "oppressing," identifies his characteristic conduct toward dallim, the economically weak or socially vulnerable. Hebrew wisdom thus recognizes that poverty itself does not guarantee righteousness or compassion; a man of low estate may exploit those still weaker than himself. The clause is nominal, with the comparison supplied without an expressed verb: such a man is "a sweeping rain and no bread." Mata r sohep denotes a rain that washes or sweeps away, and the final phrase we'en lehem heightens the irony. Rain ordinarily promises agricultural abundance and bread, yet a destructive downpour can ruin the crop, leaving famine rather than provision. The poor oppressor similarly comes from a condition in which compassion might be expected, yet his exercise of whatever power he possesses devastates those dependent upon him. The immediate context strengthens the political and social dimension: Proverbs 28:15 compares a wicked ruler over a poor people to predatory beasts, and 28:16 condemns the ruler who multiplies oppression. Verse 3 broadens that judgment by portraying oppression as morally perverse regardless of the oppressor's own impoverished background.

The Masoretic pointing reads לְאִיתִיאֵל (leʾîtîʾēl) and וְאֻכָל (weʾukal) as the proper names Ithiel and Ucal, making the clause the superscription to Agur’s instruction: his utterance is directed first to Ithiel and then to Ithiel together with Ucal. On this reading, the repeated לְאִיתִיאֵל probably singles out Ithiel before expanding the audience to include Ucal. Both names are otherwise unknown, but their obscurity does not invalidate their occurrence in a heading; Proverbs preserves several named sages whose identities are not supplied. An old and influential alternative divides the unpointed consonants differently: לְאִיתִיאֵל may be read לָאִיתִי אֵל (lāʾîtî ʾēl), “I have wearied myself, O God,” repeated for emphasis, while וְאֻכָל may be construed verbally, either “and I am able” or, under a different vocal analysis, “and I am consumed.” This rendering has real contextual attraction, since vv. 2-3 immediately continue in Agur’s first-person confession of intellectual and moral inadequacy. It also explains the otherwise unusual repetition of Ithiel. Nevertheless, it depends upon rejecting the received word division and vocalization at precisely the point where the text can be read coherently as a conventional attribution and address. The names should therefore be retained in the translation, while the alternative reading rightly highlights the humility that dominates Agur’s speech from v. 2 onward.

The clause means that rulers who exercise authority through Wisdom establish and administer just ordinances. The noun צֶדֶק (tsedeq, “righteousness,” “justice”) functions as the object of יְחֹקְקוּ (yechoqequ), the Poel imperfect third masculine plural of חקק (chaqaq). The sense is therefore not simply that nobles speak about righteousness, but that their official enactments are characterized by and give concrete expression to justice. חקק commonly denotes inscribing, engraving, or prescribing an ordinance. Its use is particularly fitting in a royal and judicial setting, since decrees could be fixed in written statutes and publicly binding judgments. The Poel stem here has an intensive or factitive nuance: these rulers promulgate or prescribe justice. English versions that render the phrase “decree justice,” “make just laws,” or “issue righteous decrees” appropriately bring out the judicial force of the expression. “Nobles” renders רוֹזְנִים (rozenim), a term for high officials, princes, or dignitaries who share in governmental administration, rather than a reference to aristocratic rank in the modern social sense. The parallelism with “kings reign” defines righteous legislation as an essential expression of legitimate rule. Verses 12-14 have identified Wisdom with prudence, counsel, sound judgment, strength, and hatred of evil; thus the justice decreed in v. 15 is not an autonomous human achievement. Within the argument of Proverbs 8, stable political authority and equitable legal order belong to the sphere over which divine Wisdom presides. The statement is general and creational in form, yet it accords with the covenantal conviction that rulers are accountable to God’s righteous standard rather than authorized to define justice by mere power.

The rāṣôn sought by the one who pursues good is best understood as acceptance or favorable regard, a term broad enough to include human goodwill while finally standing under God’s moral governance. The noun rāṣôn commonly denotes pleasure, acceptance, or favor rather than an impersonal successful result. The proverb therefore describes a fitting moral correspondence: the person characterized by an earnest pursuit of what is good finds welcome and goodwill, whereas the person bent on evil encounters the very harm he has sought. The immediate context supports a social dimension. Proverbs 11:24-26 commends generous distribution and condemns the withholding of grain from the needy; such conduct respectively draws blessing and public curse. Seeking ṭôb, “good,” thus includes actively pursuing what benefits others rather than merely desiring a private good outcome. Yet the proverb does not identify the human source of rāṣôn, and Proverbs elsewhere explicitly teaches that a good man obtains favor from the LORD (12:2) and that faithful conduct finds favor before both God and man (3:4). The omission permits the saying to state the wider order of wisdom: good conduct ordinarily receives acceptance within the community because it accords with the favor of the Lord, while evil finally returns upon its seeker as rāʿâ, harm or calamity.