The death penalty is withheld because the woman’s enslaved and unresolved legal status means that this case does not constitute adultery in the full legal sense addressed in Leviticus 20:10. She is a שפחה (shipḥâ), an enslaved woman, who is נחרפת לאיש (neḥerepet leʾîš), that is, assigned or pledged to a man, but she has neither been redeemed nor formally granted freedom. Her attachment to the man is therefore real and protected by law, yet she has not entered the legally independent condition presupposed for a free woman’s marriage. The clause “for she was not free” supplies the stated rationale for the mitigation: her lack of freedom qualifies the offense and prevents the capital sanction from being imposed. This mitigation does not render the intercourse innocent. The difficult term בִּקֹּרֶת (biqqōret) denotes a judicial reckoning or punishment; its precise form is uncertain, and “scourging” is possible but more specific than the word itself securely permits. The singular expression, “there shall be a biqqōret,” indicates that the matter is to receive formal legal sanction, while the plural “they shall not be put to death” includes both parties in the exclusion of capital punishment. The following verse confirms the man’s guilt by requiring him to bring a ram as an אָשָׁם (ʾāšām), a reparation or guilt offering, before the LORD. Thus the legislation neither equates the woman’s condition with that of a free married woman nor treats her sexual vulnerability as morally irrelevant; it recognizes a genuine violation while distinguishing its penalty from the capital judgment required for adultery involving a free wife.

The participle הַמִּטַּהֵר (hammittahēr), “the one being purified,” presents the man as still within the appointed rite of purification, not as one whose restoration remains uncertain. It is a Hithpael masculine singular participle of טהר (ṭāhēr), denoting the person undergoing the prescribed cleansing process. The preceding narrative has already declared him clean after the initial rites (vv. 7–8), yet it also requires a seven-day interval and an eighth-day sacrificial service (vv. 9–20, 30–31). The designation therefore preserves the distinction between the preliminary declaration of cleanness and the completed cultic restoration effected through the priestly offerings before the LORD. The final clause, “and the priest shall make atonement for the one being purified before the LORD,” identifies the sacrificial conclusion as necessary for renewed access to the holy presence. The Piel verb כִּפֶּר (kipper) regularly denotes the priest’s ritual act of expiation or purgation, by which the barrier associated with impurity is removed. Its use does not establish that the skin disease itself resulted from a particular moral offense; Leviticus treats severe bodily impurity as incompatible with unrestricted sanctuary fellowship, whether or not personal culpability is in view. The sin offering addresses the defiling condition, while the burnt offering, offered in connection with the grain offering, completes the worshiper’s restored presentation before God. Thus the participle emphasizes an orderly, divinely ordained transition: the formerly diseased person has been healed and declared clean, but is only now being fully reinstated before the LORD through priestly atonement.

Leviticus 11:37 establishes that contact with the carcass of an unclean creeping thing does not render dry seed intended for sowing unclean. The qualification is deliberate: the seed is described as זֶרַע זֵרוּעַ (zeraʿ zeruaʿ), literally "seed of sowing," further defined by the Niphal imperfect יִזָּרֵעַ (yizzāreaʿ), "which is to be sown." Such seed remains טָהוֹר (ṭāhôr), ceremonially clean, even though the carcass itself communicates impurity to persons and to certain objects elsewhere in the paragraph (vv. 32–36). The law therefore concerns ritual status, not the physical possibility that a dead creature might touch agricultural seed. Verse 38 supplies the intended contrast: if water has been put upon the seed and the carcass then falls on it, the seed becomes unclean. In the logic of the legislation, moisture alters the relevant status of the seed, making it liable to contract the impurity that dry seed does not receive. The text does not explain this distinction as a sanitary principle, nor does it say that moisture removes impurity from the carcass. Rather, it marks a cultic boundary between dry seed preserved for planting and seed wetted in a manner that places it within the sphere of food or handling susceptible to defilement. Later Jewish legal discussion developed detailed rules concerning what liquids qualify and how wetting occurs, but the immediate biblical point is narrower: dry seed designated for sowing is exempt from contamination by such contact, while wetted seed is not.

The plural suffix in וְאֹתָם (weʾōtām, “and them”) refers to the sacrificial materials that the cleansed man has brought, not to additional persons. Verse 10 has enumerated the two male lambs, the ewe lamb, the grain offering, and the log of oil; these are the natural antecedents of the plural pronoun. The following procedure confirms this reading: verse 12 immediately singles out one male lamb and the log of oil for presentation as a guilt offering and wave offering. Thus the man and the requisite offerings are formally brought into the sphere of sanctuary service together. The priest is called הַמְטַהֵר (hamĕṭahēr), a Piel active participle of טהר (ṭhr), “the one purifying,” because he administers the divinely appointed rite. The afflicted person is הַמִּטַּהֵר (hammittaḥēr), a Hithpael participle, “the one being cleansed” or “the one undergoing purification.” The contrast is purposeful: ritual restoration is not self-effected, even though the man has obeyed the prescribed preparations; it is enacted through priestly ministry before the LORD. The expression “before the LORD” is qualified by “at the entrance of the tent of meeting.” The man does not enter the sanctuary proper, but is presented at its authorized threshold, where the offerings may be received and their rites performed. His former exclusion from the camp and from sacred fellowship (Lev. 13:46; 14:8) is therefore answered by a public, cultically regulated presentation at the LORD’s dwelling. The verse introduces not a private declaration of recovery but the covenantal rite by which cleansing is recognized and completed before God.

The final clause principally describes the Israelite’s status and thereby supplies the basis for the valuation: his service to the resident alien is to be reckoned as the fixed-term labor of a hired worker, not as ownership of a slave in perpetuity. Although the immediately preceding subject is “the silver of his sale” (kesep mimkārô), the masculine singular imperfect יִהְיֶה (yihyeh, Qal imperfect, “he/it shall be”) with עִמּוֹ (“with him”) most naturally resumes the sold Israelite. Verse 53 confirms this reading by stating explicitly that he is to be “as a hired worker year by year” with the foreigner. The awkwardness of translations that render “it shall be with him” arises from the Hebrew’s unexpressed subject; the sense is, “he shall be with him as a hired servant.” This status governs the accounting required by the preceding clause. The man and his buyer are to calculate (ḥiššab, Piel sequential perfect) the period from the sale until Jubilee, since the original payment purchased only a limited number of years of service. The redemption payment is therefore prorated according to the years remaining, as vv. 51–52 make explicit: many remaining years require a larger repayment; few remaining years require less. The buyer is entitled to compensation corresponding to the unexpired service term, but not to a price reflecting permanent possession of an Israelite. The comparison with a hired servant does not necessarily prescribe a particular wage scale independent of the original transaction. Rather, it establishes the legal character of the transaction and its equitable measure: the sale money must be treated as payment for time-bound labor. In the context of vv. 47–55, this protects the Israelite who has sold himself because of poverty, preserves his covenant claim upon the land and Jubilee, and denies the foreign purchaser the unrestricted dominion associated with chattel slavery.

Leviticus 18:17 does not merely repeat the prohibition of verse 10; it addresses the same family relationships from a different point of reference. Verse 10 forbids intercourse with “the daughter of your son” or “the daughter of your daughter,” that is, with a man’s own granddaughters by blood. Verse 17, by contrast, speaks of “the daughter of her son” and “the daughter of her daughter.” The feminine singular suffixes identify the antecedent as the woman introduced at the beginning of the verse. The prohibition therefore concerns a woman’s female descendants—her daughter and granddaughters—in relation to the man who has taken, or seeks to take, the woman herself. The change from the repeated formula “you shall not uncover” to “you shall not take” (tiqqaḥ, Qal imperfect of laqaḥ) is significant but does not narrow the law to a merely formal marriage contract. In this context, taking a woman is the marital acquisition that leads to the prohibited “uncovering of nakedness” (legallôt ʿerwātāh, Piel infinitive construct). The verse forbids the sexual-marital union of a man with a woman and with any direct female descendant of that woman. It thus guards against the collapse of generational distinctions within a household and family line. The daughter is named first, and the two kinds of granddaughter are then exhaustively specified, since descent may proceed through either a son or a daughter. The closing explanation, “they are her close relatives” (šeʾērāh hēnnāh), grounds the prohibition in the woman’s own flesh-kinship. The plural pronoun hēnnāh refers to the female descendants just named, while šeʾērāh, literally “her flesh,” marks them as belonging to her immediate kinship circle. Verse 10 therefore excludes incest by consanguinity with one’s own descendants, whereas verse 17 excludes a corresponding violation created through union with a woman and her descendants. Both prohibitions culminate in the same concern: sexual access must not dissolve the divinely ordered boundaries of family generations. The designation zimmāh, “a depraved scheme” or “heinous sexual offense,” underscores that this is not a minor ritual irregularity but a grave distortion of kinship order.

The clause identifies the persistent discoloration as a destructive contamination of the article itself, not as a condition affecting a human scalp. פְּחֶתֶת (peḥethet), a feminine noun used predicatively in “it is a peḥethet,” denotes a wasting, corroding, or fretting infection. The older rendering “fretting leprosy” rightly conveys its destructive character, though “leprosy” can mislead if it is taken as a modern medical diagnosis. Since the mark has neither changed its appearance (literally, “its eye,” עַיִן, ʿayin) nor spread after washing, it is shown to be a persistent corruption rather than removable surface staining; consequently the affected object is declared unclean and is to be burned. The terms קָרַחַת (qāraḥat) and גַּבַּחַת (gabbāḥat) are drawn from the preceding discussion of baldness on the back or front of a person’s head (13:40–43). In the present context, however, their pronominal suffixes refer to the infected garment, woven material, or leather article described in vv. 47–54. The terms are therefore used figuratively or technically for the corresponding exposed portions or sides of the article, commonly rendered “inside or outside” or “in a bare spot, whether on the inside or outside.” The precise distinction between the two terms cannot be fixed with certainty, but the contrast comprehensively locates the corrosion in any part of the object. “Scab” is not the meaning of gabbāḥat; both words retain the imagery of a bald or denuded surface, transferred here from the human body to the material under priestly inspection.

The clause does not authorize consumption on the third day; it requires the destruction by fire of whatever remains when that day is reached. The Niphal participle הַנּוֹתָר (hannôtār, “that which remains”) identifies the portion left over from the permitted period of eating, while עַד־יוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי (ʿad-yôm haššelîšî, “until/by the third day”) marks the terminus at which that remainder must be dealt with. The following Niphal imperfect יִשָּׂרֵף (yiśśārēp, “it shall be burned”) has legal force: the remaining flesh is to be consigned to fire rather than retained or consumed. The preceding temporal expressions establish the permitted period: the offering is eaten “on the day of your sacrifice” and “on the next day” (וּמִמָּחֳרָת, ûmimmāḥŏrāt). The reference to the third day therefore concerns disposal, not an additional day for eating. Leviticus 7:16–18 states the same rule more explicitly for votive and freewill peace offerings: the offering may be eaten on the day of sacrifice and the following day, but what remains “on the third day” must be burned, and eating any of it on that day renders the sacrifice unacceptable. Leviticus 19:6 thus abbreviates a regulation whose point is that sacrificial flesh may not remain available beyond the second day.

The concession for poverty reduces the offerings that may be supplied by birds, but it does not dispense with the lamb of the guilt offering (אָשָׁם, ʾāšām). The required lamb is specifically designated “for a wave offering, to make atonement for him.” In the ensuing rite, its blood is placed on the purified person’s right ear, thumb, and great toe (vv. 14, 17), and the accompanying oil is applied at the same points. Thus the remaining lamb is not merely the largest available sacrifice; it furnishes the blood-and-oil ritual by which the formerly unclean person is publicly restored to full covenantal standing. By contrast, v. 22 permits two turtledoves or two pigeons to serve as the sin offering and burnt offering. This parallels other provisions in Leviticus where birds are accepted from those unable to provide larger animals (cf. 5:7–10; 12:8). The distinction should not be pressed to mean that the guilt offering atones for a greater degree of personal moral fault than the sin offering. The impurity caused by skin disease is not presented here as proof of a particular transgression. Rather, the distinctive function of the ʾāšām in this restoration ceremony requires a lamb whose blood can be handled in the prescribed manner, while the sin and burnt offerings may be economically commuted. Poverty therefore alters the scale of the sacrifice without removing the essential rites of atonement and reintegration.

The expression denotes a woman whose marriage has been dissolved by divorce, not a special class limited by the manner in which the separation occurred. The adjective גְּרוּשָׁה (gerushah), a feminine Qal passive participle of גָּרַשׁ (garash, “drive out, send away”), describes one who has been sent away. The phrase מֵאִישָׁהּ (me’ishah, “from her husband”) specifies the marital relationship from which she has been separated; it does not introduce an exception for some other purported form of divorce. Within Pentateuchal law, divorce is characteristically conceived as the husband’s formal dismissal of his wife (Deut 24:1–4), and the wording reflects that legal setting. The qualification also distinguishes divorce from widowhood. A regular priest may marry a widow, since Lev 21:7 excludes only the prostitute, the profaned woman, and the divorced woman; the more stringent rule for the high priest explicitly adds the widow to the prohibited categories (Lev 21:14). Thus the priestly restriction concerns a prior marriage ended by divorce rather than by the husband’s death. The repeated prohibition, “they shall not take,” treats marriage as the relevant act, and the reason given—“for he is holy to his God”—grounds the distinction in the priest’s consecrated status and representative service before the Lord.

The phrase “they shall take to you” (wĕyiqḥû ʾēleykā) identifies Moses as the covenantal mediator through whom the command and the people’s contribution are ordered; it does not imply that Moses personally performed the priestly service of tending the lampstand. The second masculine singular suffix on ʾēleykā (“to you”) addresses Moses, who receives this instruction from the Lord. Yet v. 3 immediately assigns the regular arrangement of the lamps to Aaron, and v. 4 speaks of Aaron’s continual ordering of the lamps before the Lord. Moses receives the oil in his representative and administrative capacity, whereas Aaron and his sons conduct the sanctuary rite. This wording corresponds closely to Exodus 27:20: Israel is commanded to bring pure beaten olive oil “to you” for the light, followed by the designation of Aaron and his sons as those who tend it. The distinction preserves the ordered cooperation of Israel, Moses, and the priesthood. The whole covenant people supplies what is required for the public worship of God; Moses, as the divinely appointed mediator of the Sinaitic covenant, receives and transmits the divine ordinances; and the Aaronic priests alone perform the cultic ministry within the tent of meeting. The expression therefore should not be pressed into a claim that Moses displaced Aaron in priestly work. Leviticus is careful to distinguish Moses’ unique revelatory and mediatorial role from Aaron’s hereditary priestly office. The oil is brought “to” Moses because the command is framed through him, but its stated purpose—“to cause a lamp to burn continually” (lĕhaʿălōt nēr tāmîd)—is fulfilled through Aaron’s priestly oversight before the Lord.

Leviticus 20:1 is a formal divine-speech heading that marks the penalties of vv. 2–27 as the direct revelation of Yahweh mediated through Moses. The verb waydabbēr, a Piel wayyiqtol of dābar, ordinarily carries the narrative sequence forward: “And Yahweh spoke.” Although the Piel stem can sometimes be treated as more intensive than the Qal, no special nuance of forceful or repeated speech should be pressed here. In the Pentateuch, the expression is a conventional formula for authoritative divine address, particularly in material that sets forth covenantal statutes. The infinitive construct lēʾmōr, “saying,” is dependent upon “spoke” and introduces the content that follows. It does not imply that Moses is merely to report a private communication in his own words; rather, it signals that the ensuing command is the speech Yahweh gives through Moses. Verse 2 accordingly begins with an imperative directed to Moses, “Say to the people of Israel,” followed by the stipulated sanctions. The formula also binds Leviticus 20 closely to the preceding holiness legislation: the chapter is not an independent human appendix to Leviticus 18–19, but a further, divinely authorized exposition of the covenant’s demand for Israel’s holiness and of the judgments attached to its violation.

“One from his brothers” is not restricted to a biological brother but introduces the broader category of near kin who possess the right to redeem an Israelite sold into the service of a resident alien. The noun אֶחָיו (ʾeḥāyw, “his brothers”) can denote literal siblings, but in Leviticus it also functions within Israel’s kinship vocabulary for fellow members of the covenant people and, more narrowly here, relatives responsible for preserving a family member’s standing. Verse 49 immediately explicates the expression: an uncle, a cousin, or another close blood relative from his clan may redeem him. The following list therefore does not replace the “brothers” of v. 48 with a different class of persons; it specifies the relatives comprehended by the general expression. The phrase אֶחָד מֵאֶחָיו (ʾeḥād mēʾeḥāyw), literally “one from his brothers,” is indefinite and distributive: any qualified kinsman may act, rather than a uniquely designated eldest brother. The Qal imperfect יִגְאָלֶנּוּ (yigʾālennû, “may/shall redeem him”) employs the juridical language of the גֹּאֵל (gōʾēl), the kinsman-redeemer. Such redemption restored the impoverished Israelite from servitude before the Jubilee by paying the remaining value of his labor to the foreign master, as vv. 50–52 explain. The statement that “redemption shall be for him” establishes this as a protected covenantal provision: sale to a wealthy sojourner did not dissolve the Israelite’s family identity or extinguish his claim to freedom. The wider paragraph finally adds that the man may redeem himself if his resources later suffice (v. 49), showing that kin redemption is a divinely ordered means of release rather than an assertion that only one particular relative bears an absolute and exclusive duty.

The immediate context confirms that this eating was required precisely because the animal’s blood had not been brought into the inner sanctuary (Lev. 10:18; cf. 6:30). Sin offerings whose blood was taken inside were burned rather than eaten, whereas the priests ate the flesh of the ordinary communal sin offering in a holy place. The two procedures were complementary cultic modes, not competing theories of atonement. Moses’ rebuke thus rests on the fact that the goat had been given by the LORD for this priestly ministry of atonement; its sanctity required neither neglect nor ordinary consumption, but its prescribed reception by the priests before the LORD.

The expression מִזֶּרַע הָאָרֶץ (mizzeraʿ hāʾāreṣ), literally “from the seed of the land,” denotes the land’s seed-grown produce, not seed grain held back for planting. The preposition מִן (min, “from”) identifies the source or class of the tithe: it comes from the agricultural yield of the arable land. In this context זֶרַע (zeraʿ) may denote seed as that which produces a crop and, by extension, the crop or yield associated with sowing. The following parallel phrase, “from the fruit of the tree” (מִפְּרִי הָעֵץ), confirms that the concern is with harvest products: field crops on the one hand and orchard produce on the other. The verse therefore gives a comprehensive designation of the tithe from cultivated produce. Grain and other seed-bearing crops are included under “the seed of the land,” while fruit from trees is separately named; the animal tithe is addressed in vv. 32–33. This agricultural tithe is not described merely as revenue for a religious institution. The emphatic pronoun הוּא (hûʾ), “it,” grounds the declaration: the tithe “belongs to the LORD” and “is holy to the LORD” (קֹדֶשׁ לַיהוָה, qōdeš laYHWH). Its eventual assignment to the Levites elsewhere (Num. 18:21–24) does not diminish its prior consecration to Yahweh. The redemption provision in the following verse, which permits the owner to recover produce by adding a fifth, likewise presupposes a definable portion of harvested goods rather than an obligation to tithe seed reserved for the next planting.

The expression does not restrict the prohibition to an unusual class of private sales; it encompasses ordinary acquisitions from a fellow Israelite and deliberately places buyer and seller under the same obligation. The finite verb תִמְכְּרוּ (timkerû, Qal imperfect, “you sell”) is coordinated with קָנֹה (qānōh, Qal infinitive absolute, “buying/to buy”). Here the infinitive absolute has a substantival force after אוֹ (ʾô, “or”): “if you sell a sale to your fellow, or [in] buying from the hand of your fellow.” The shift in verbal form is stylistic and does not weaken the parallelism. Both parties to the transaction are addressed by the plural prohibition אַל־תּוֹנוּ (ʾal-tônû), “do not wrong.” “From the hand of” (מִיַּד, miyyad) is an idiom for receiving something from another’s possession or control. It identifies the fellow Israelite as the source of the acquired property, not necessarily a face-to-face exchange outside a market or legal setting. The noun מִמְכָּר (mimkār, “thing sold, sale”) likewise refers broadly to a saleable possession. Nevertheless, the immediate context gives the command a definite content: verses 15–16 require the price of land-use rights to correspond to the years remaining until the Jubilee. Thus the Hiphil of יָנָה (yānâ), “wrong, exploit, overreach,” includes manipulating price against the covenantal terms governing the sale. The reciprocal language—“your fellow” (עָמִית, ʿāmît) and “his brother” (אָח, ʾāḥ)—marks such commerce as an intra-Israelite covenant obligation rather than a sphere exempt from the demands of justice.

A mark that has become dim is not thereby treated as wholly removed. The adjective כֵּהָה (kehah), a Piel perfect from כהה (kahah, “to grow dim” or “fade”), indicates that the visible lesion has weakened after the washing, but the ensuing command to excise it shows that some trace of the suspect condition remains. The priest is therefore not to destroy the entire article, as he must when the mark persists or spreads (vv. 51–52), but neither may he pronounce it clean at this point. The affected section is removed from the garment, leather article, warp, or woof. The phrase אַחֲרֵי הֻכַּבֵּס אֹתוֹ (“after it has been washed”) employs the Hothpaal infinitive construct of כבס (kabas), denoting the laundering of the object. Washing functions as an appointed test and means of purification: a malignant or persistent textile mildew does not yield to it, whereas a fading mark may be localized and removed. The Qal form וְקָרַע (weqaraʿ, “then he shall tear”) concerns the removal of the marked portion, not the destruction of the whole item. Such excision is especially intelligible for woven material, where a stained or diseased area could be cut away; in the case of עור (ʿor, “leather”), it denotes removal of the contaminated portion of the leather article. Verse 56 thus occupies a deliberate intermediate stage in the procedure. The article is preserved provisionally, but the remaining material must still be washed again; only when the mark has departed after that washing is the article declared clean (v. 58). The legislation distinguishes disappearance, fading, and persistence with care, locating cleanness not in a merely reduced appearance but in the eventual removal of the plague from the retained material.

The comparison with the peace offering governs the disposal of the animal’s fat, not the purpose of the sacrifice as a whole. In the present case of the common Israelite’s sin offering (4:27–31), the worshiper brings a female goat because guilt has been incurred through an unintentional violation of the LORD’s command. Yet the designated fat portions are removed and burned upon the altar in the same manner as those of the peace offering. The Hiphil imperfect yasir ("he shall remove," from sur) is explained by the passive Hophal perfect husar ("was removed"): the established peace-offering procedure supplies the pattern for identifying and handling the portions reserved for the altar. The phrase reah nihoah, "a soothing aroma," does not imply that sin itself is pleasing to God, nor does it reduce atonement to a merely aesthetic rite. It is conventional sacrificial language for the LORD’s favorable reception of an offering rendered according to his ordinance. In the sin offering, the animal’s blood deals with the altar and, in the preceding verses, is applied at its horns; the fat is then turned into smoke as the LORD’s portion. The sequence culminates in the priest’s kipper (Piel of kapar), "making atonement," followed by wenislach lo, "and it shall be forgiven him." The Niphal of salah presents forgiveness as the divine result granted through the priestly rite. Thus the pleasing aroma expresses God’s acceptance of the sacrifice he has appointed, while the final declaration identifies its covenantal effect: the offender’s guilt is forgiven.

The “other dust” is fresh earth used to renew the house’s earthen plaster, not a separate ritual substance scattered over the building. The preceding procedure requires that the affected stones be removed (v. 40) and that the interior surface be scraped, with the removed material deposited outside the city in an unclean place (v. 41). Verse 42 then describes the corresponding restoration: replacement stones are installed, and new earthen material is applied as a coating. The sequence makes the contrast deliberate: the old material associated with the suspected plague is removed, while “other” or fresh material replaces it. The noun עָפָר (‘āphār) commonly denotes loose earth, soil, or dust and can refer to the earthen material from which a plaster coating was prepared. Its masculine singular adjective אַחֵר (’aḥēr, “other”) distinguishes this fresh earth from the scraped-off material of v. 41. The verb טָח (ṭûaḥ), here a Qal sequential perfect, means to smear over or plaster; it is used elsewhere of coating a surface rather than merely throwing dust upon it. The verse therefore presupposes a stone house whose interior was finished with an earth-based plaster or mortar. The repair is practical, yet it belongs to the priestly inspection procedure: restoration permits a subsequent determination whether the affliction has truly departed or has returned (vv. 43–45).

“All its blood” denotes all the blood remaining for disposal after the prescribed application to the horns, not a literal recovery and pouring out of the blood already placed there. The sequence is explicit: the priest takes “some of its blood” (mi-ddāmāh) with his finger and places it upon the horns; thereafter “all its blood” (kol-dāmāh) is poured out at the altar’s base. The distributive force of “some” establishes that the horn-application uses only a portion, while kol marks the complete disposition of the remainder. This is the consistent procedure for the purification offering of an ordinary Israelite (vv. 25, 30, 34). Blood is first presented at the altar at the point represented by its horns, and the remainder is poured at its foundation. The expression does not imply that the blood on the horns was insignificant or that the base received blood apart from the atoning rite; both actions belong to the single ritual manipulation of sacrificial blood. Yet the prescribed locations differentiate their functions: the horns receive the blood in a focused act of purification, while the altar’s base receives the remainder as the blood is returned before God at the sanctuary altar. The wording thus records orderly sacrificial procedure rather than an arithmetically exhaustive statement about every drop of blood.